When technological innovation is not enough : understanding the take up of advanced energy technology by Gherardi, Silvia et al.
WHEN TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION IS NOT ENOUGH
UNDERSTANDING THE TAKE UP OF ADVANCED
ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
SILVIA GHERARDI, RICHARD HOLTI, DAVIDE NICOLINI
QUADERNO 24
Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale
Università degli Studi di Trento

WHEN TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION IS NOT ENOUGH
UNDERSTANDING THE TAKE UP OF ADVANCED
ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
SILVIA GHERARDI, RICHARD HOLTI, DAVIDE NICOLINI1

WHEN TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION IS NOT ENOUGH
UNDERSTANDING THE TAKE UP OF ADVANCED
ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
SILVIA GHERARDI, RICHARD HOLTI, DAVIDE NICOLINI
QUADERNO 24
Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale
Università degli Studi di Trento
6I Quaderni del Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale costituiscono una iniziativa edito-
riale finalizzata alla tempestiva diffusione in ambito universitario di materiale di ricerca, riflessioni
teoriche  e resoconti  di seminari di studio di particolare rilevanza.   L’accettazione dei diversi
contributi è subordinata all’approvazione di un’apposita Commissione scientifica, che si avvale del
parere di referees esterni al Dipartimento.  Le richieste dei Quaderni vanno inviate ai rispettivi
autori.
1. E. BAUMGARTNER,  L’identità nel cambiamento,  1983.
2. C. SARACENO,  Changing the Gender Structure of Family Organization,  1984.
3. G. SARCHIELLI,  M. DEPOLO  e  G. AVEZZU’,  Rappresentazioni del lavoro e identità
sociale in un gruppo di lavoratori irregolari,  1984.
4. S. GHERARDI,  A. STRATI  (a cura di),  Sviluppo e declino. La dimensione temporale nello
studio delle organizzazioni,  1984.
5/6. A. STRATI  (a cura di),  The Symbolics of Skill,  1985.
7. G. CHIARI,  Guida bibliografica alle tecniche di ricerca sociale,  1986.
8. M. DEPOLO,  R. FASOL,  F. FRACCAROLI,  G. SARCHIELLI,  L’azione negoziale,
1986.
9. C. SARACENO,  Corso della vita e approccio biografico,  1986.
10. R. PORRO  (a cura di),  Le comunicazioni di massa,  1987.
11/12. G. CHIARI,  P. PERI,  I modelli log-lineari nella ricerca sociologica,  1987.
13. S. GHERARDI,  B. TURNER,  Real Men Don’t Collect Soft Data,  1987.
14. D. LA VALLE,  Utilitarismo e teoria sociale: verso più efficaci indicatori del benessere,
1988.
15. B. GRANCELLI,   Le dita invisibili della mano visibile.   Mercati, gerarchie e clan nella
crisi dell’economia di comando,  1990.
17. H.M. A. SCHADEE,  A. SCHIZZEROTTO,  Social Mobility of Men and Women in
Contemporary Italy,  1990.
18. J. ECHEVERRIA,  I rapporti tra stato, società ed economia in America Latina,  1991.
19. D. LA VALLE,  La società della scelta. Effetti del mutamento sociale sull’economia e la
politica,  1991.
20. A. MELUCCI,  L’Aids come costruzione sociale,  1992.
21. S. GHERARDI,  A. STRATI  (a cura di),   Processi cognitivi dell’agire organizzativo: stru-
menti di analisi, 1994.
22. E. SCHNABL,  Maschile e femminile.  Immagini della differenza sessuale in una ricerca tra
i giovani,  1994.
23. D. LA VALLE,  La considerazione come strumento di regolazione sociale,  1995.
Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale
Università di Trento
Via Verdi 26  -  I - 38100 Trento  -  Italia
Tel. 0461/881322
Telex 400674  UNITN I
Telefax 0461/881348
7This Quaderno of the Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale is aimed
at presenting some reflections on the social, economic and technological
forces and circumstances that encourage or discourage the take-up of
advanced energy-efficient technologies within manufacturing processes in
European enterprises. Its background lays in a wider research project
conducted in the years 1995-1998 called SORGET, which involved four
European countries.
On the basis of extended fieldwork carried out using both qualitative and
quantitative methodologies, it was discovered that no single factor or limited
group of factors has a simple determining role in shaping the take-up of
energy-efficient technologies.  Take-up occurs as a consequence of the
complex interaction of a wide variety of social, economic, organisational
and technological developments.
The study found that the extent to which consideration of energy issues is
explicit, and how it is linked to wider corporate objectives, can be understood
in terms of a firm, at any point in time, exhibiting what amounts to a
“corporate stance” on energy matters.  This is a way of thinking and acting
about energy matters, negotiated between people and demonstrated in their
daily behaviour.  The crucial differences between organisations lie in the
extent to which their corporate energy stances are proactive and global as
opposed to reactive and local.
The data, on which the present reflections are based, were produced within
SORGET (Social and Organisational Issues in The Adoption of Advanced
Energy Technologies), a transnational research effort partially funded by
the European Commission within the Joule Thermie Programme. The
SORGET project was coordinated by Richard Holti (The Tavistock Institute)
and three European partners: Silvia Gherardi (University of Trento), Peter
Plougmann (The Danish Technological Institute) and Peter Groenewegen
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8(Free University of Amsterdam). We are indebt with our collegues for the
generous contribution profused in their national reports and in the final
report to the European Commission, nevertheless the final responsibility
for the considerations reported in the Quaderno is on the authors.
We wish to thank all the collegues which took part in the development of
the national reports and acknowledge the role of AROC (Associazione per
la Ricerca sulle Organizzazioni Complesse) in supporting the Italian team
(formed by Davide Nicolini and Bruno Bolognini).
We are also indebt to the Advisory Panel of European experts in energy
technologies formed by: Niels O Gram, Energy Manager, Confederation of
Danish Industries; Nigel Pratten, Manager, Energy Efficiency Department,
Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU), UK; F van Nielen, Managing
Director MINT (Market Focused Intersectoral Technologies), NOVEM,
Netherlands; W M van Rijnsoever, Managing Director MPI (Environmental
Plan Industry), Gasunie, Netherlands, David White, David J White
Associates, UK, and Piergiulio Avanzini, CNR, Italy.
(1)
 The names of the authors appear in alphabetic order and Silvia Gherardi wrote sections 1-5,
Richard Holti wrote section 7 and Davide Nicolini wrote section 6 and 8.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the first “energy crisis” of the post-war period, in the early 1970s, a
considerable amount of public and industrial funding has been sunk into
the development of technologies for producing more energy efficient
machinery, as well as renewable energy sources, with a view to reducing
energy consumption per  unit of industrial output.
Although the picture is uneven across the European Union, there is increased
public and governmental concern about industrial energy consumption and
in particular its link to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.  A number of
European member states have introduced schemes to encourage enterprises
to find ways of reducing energy consumption and emissions.  Examples
include the programmes of support for energy savings within enterprises
and for the use of renewable resources within industry managed by the
Danish Energy Agency and by NOVEM in the Netherlands.
The main aim of the SORGET study, was to develop a better understanding
of decision making about the implementation of advanced energy
technologies, so that industrial interest in achieving lower cost production
can be channelled more effectively into a more environmentally sustainable
mode of operation.
  The project concerned the forces that encourage or discourage the effective
take-up of advanced energy-efficient technologies within manufacturing
processes.  The project employed social science perspectives to understand
the social and economic forces and organisational processes which
encourage or discourage decisions within industrial companies to adopt
these technologies.  It examined the organisational processes that affect the
course of implementation of advanced energy technologies and investigates
the consequences for the effectiveness of these technologies in use.  The
findings of the research work allowed the drawing out of implications for
regional, national and European Union policies intended to encourage
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rational use of energy within industry.  On the basis of the understanding of
non-technological barriers and incentives affecting industrial take-up of
energy technologies the project offers a contribution to devise effective
public policies and initiatives that can help industry to increase the take up
of energy efficient technologies.
The present Quaderno is not at attempt to summarize the whole SORGET
project, rather it is aimed at conducting some “post hoc” reflections after
the study was completed and some authors had the luxury to seat and discuss
the research experience without the pressure of meeting the deadlines.
The Quaderno begins by summarising some of the main concepts used in
the literature to make sense of technological innovation and take up.  After
discussing the similarities and differences in the national contexts influencing
the level and conditions of take-up of advanced energy technologies (AETs),
we introduce the overall research design and methodology and the
framework description of what AET stands for used in the research.
Next, the paper focuses on the results of the case studies carried out in each
of the participating countries.  It is argued that the key factor underlying the
pattern of take-up (or non take-up) of particular energy efficient technologies
or measures within a firm can be understood as a scope of consideration.
This amounts to a set of organisational routines which at any point in time
effectively prescribes the range of energy-related technologies or measures
to be considered for adoption.  Technologies may not be adopted because
they are formally investigated and then rejected, for example because the
pay-back period for a return on investment capital is too large.  However,
technologies may also simply not be considered because they lie outside
the scope of consideration, usually because their implications in terms of
disrupting established production technologies and ways of operating make
them too risky to be given formal consideration.  The key to understanding
take-up of energy technologies is not so much rational decision-making
criteria as how decision horizons are shaped.  The report examines the factors
affecting the scope of consideration as well as the way in which it is shaped.
Finally, we derive some broad reflections to indicate some policy actions
which are useful to encourage the take-up of advanced Energy technologies
in manufacturing.
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2. FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING
INNOVATION IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
Systematic study of the diffusion of innovations originated in American
rural sociology of the 1940s and its endeavour to understand and promote
the adoption of new crop hybrids by Midwestern farmers (Ryan and Gross,
1943; Crane, 1972). The concepts then developed were soon adopted by
other disciplines, like education, marketing and mass communication, until
a sound tradition of research had been established.
According to Everett Rogers, studies based on the diffusion approach share
the idea that “Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is
communicated through certain channels over time among members of a
social system.” (1995, p. 5). The approach includes two main variants. The
first has been inspired by Gabriele Tarde’s studies on social imitation and
views diffusion as a process of communication and influence among
individuals: potential users come to know about innovations through
individuals who have already adopted them, and are persuaded to follow
their example by communicative processes. A second variant, closely tied
to the former one, conceives diffusion as a mainly economic process based
on costs/benefits calculations by potential users: the greater the cost and
the risk, the slower the diffusion of the innovation will be; the higher the
expected profit, the more rapidly the innovation will spread (Mansfield,
1968; Attewell, 1992; Rogers, 1995).
The majority of the studies that employ the diffusion model seek to explain
why innovations diffuse slowly at the beginning, then grow suddenly and
rapidly, and finally decline – a pattern represented by the S-shaped curve
(Ryan and Gross, 1943; Brown, 1981) shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Curve representing the diffusion dynamic
The traditional approach explains this phenomenon as resulting from the
combination of various factors: the properties of the innovation (perceived
advantage, compatibility, complexity, testability), modes of communication
in the social system, the characteristics of the subjects involved (whether
they are innovators, followers, traditionalists, etc.) and their role in the social
structure (opinion leaders), and decision processes (Rogers, 1995).
Although the diffusion approach derives from study of the adoption of
innovations by individuals, and although it is based on a model of rational
decision-making, it has been extended without substantial modifications to
analysis of innovation in organizations (Czepiel, 1975; Rogers and Arwala-
Rogers, 1976). In this case organizations are equated to supra-individual
entities – in line with the traditional functionalist approach – and they are
studied by applying the conceptual apparatus developed for analysis of
diffusion processes in social systems. Researchers initially concentrated on
drawing up typologies of forms of organizational innovativeness and on
describing the structural factors that determine the diverse behaviours of
organizations vis-à-vis innovation. Only in the early 1970s did they begin
to interest themselves not only in the dynamics of populations of
organizations but also in diffusion processes within organizations (Zaltman
et al., 1973).
For a long period of time, the theory of diffusion constituted “normal
science” (Kuhn, 1970) in the study of innovation. In the last two decades,
however, a rising tide of criticism has bee directed at its basic assumptions.
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It has been pointed out that, because the approach equates adoption with a
learning or communication process, it emphasises the demand dimension,
while at the same assuming that all potential users have equal access to the
innovation (Brown, 1981). However, this was to neglect the role of supply
and its effects on the circulation of the innovation. Every innovation is
promoted by organizations and institutions, which concentrate on specific
sectors in their promotional activity, so that the notion of equal access is a
theoretical fiction (Brown, 1981; Attweell, 1992).
Secondly, it has been pointed out that the theory does not take account of
institutional and cultural factors (local regulations, historical constraints
and precedents, practices) which may encourage or discourage adoption of
the innovation. Some authors have noted that this criticism also applies to
the economic version of the theory, which, although it considers both demand
and supply, usually ignores any institutional factor and non-monetary barrier
(Granovetter, 1982, 1985; Cool et al., 1997). This criticism is echoed by
scholars of the ‘evolutionary theory of firms’, who base their approach on
the untenability of the neo-classical assumption implicit in the theory of
diffusion that there is an omniscient actor who seeks to maximize profit in
the presence of uncertainty (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988).
Finally, it has been observed that the approach is based on the evidently
positivist assumption that every innovation constitutes ‘progress’, so that
all those who become aware of an innovation will be induced to adopt it
and to diffuse it in their turn. If an innovation fails to spread, therefore, this
is due to ignorance or misunderstanding of its benefits – and these will be
sooner or later be eliminated by the processes of persuasion studied by the
theory (Rogers, 1995). Here the theory clearly displays its functionalist
and rationalist imprint and a cleverly concealed circularity: the diffusion
approach presupposes a positive attitude towards progress and innovation
which it then sets out to explain.
Criticisms have also been brought against the theory’s application in
organizational analysis, and in particular against the individualist and
mechanistic nature of the diffusion model. The construction of typologies
of organizations according to their propensity to innovate obscures rather
than sheds light on the phenomenon. Notions like that of ‘early adopter’
applied to organizations give rise to an anthropomorphism which hampers
rather than helps empirical research. The theory of diffusion does not make
clear who is entitled to speak on behalf of an organization, and it does not
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explain to what extent it is possible to regard organizations as perfectly
homogeneous and coherent units.
The approach is also criticised for developing a notion of a homogeneous
and uniform interorganizational field very different from that described by
other authors. The adoption of an innovation does not take place in a vacuum,
as implied by many of the quantitative studies on diffusion, but instead in
an interorganizational field comprising a complex web of institutional
pressures and strategic concerns (Powell and Di Maggio, 1991). The theory’s
emphasis on the individual organization and its characteristics, moreover,
obscures phenomena like critical mass (Farrel and Saloner, 1987),
institutional pressure (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Di Maggio and Powell,
1983; Zucker, 1987), and fashion (Abrahamson, 1991; Czarniawska and
Jorges, 1995), which determine the fate of novelties and innovations.
Furthermore, the theory of diffusion draws a rigid distinction between
organization and environment, thereby ignoring recent findings on the
permeability of organizational boundaries and the complex interactions that
take place among productive organizations, research institutions, suppliers,
and market (Nelson and Winter, 1977; 1982).
Finally, as various authors have convincingly argued, decision-making
processes in organizations are much more complex than the theory of
diffusion assumes, with its obsolete and simplistic model of dichotomous
(adopt or not to adopt) and rational organizational decision-making
(Gherardi, 1985; Grandori, 1984).
The criticisms levelled toward the diffusion model have been accompanied
by the attempt to produce alternative theoretical frameworks for
understanding the innovation process. Two of the most accredited
alternatives for conceptaualising the innovation process besides the diffusion
model are the so called “Innovation Studies”, stemming from the work
carried out in the Schumpeterian tradition, and the constructivist approach
of the “Social Construction of Technology”.
The “innovation studies” literature, broadly inspired by the Schumpeterian
tradition of industrial economics, focuses on understanding the processes
involved in the production and diffusion of technological innovations, and
on understanding why some firms and national systems appear to be more
successful at various kinds of innovation than others (Nelson and Winter
1977; 1982; Freeman, 1982).
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This literature seeks to understand the nature of technological knowledge
diffusion processes within an industry or sector. It draws attention on the
one hand to importance of existing bodies of knowledge, both explicit and
tacit, within a company in determining the likelihood of new technologies
being acquired or developed in-house.
On the other hand, writers in this tradition have explored the importance of
the network of relationships companies have with outside bodies - both
other companies and state agencies, in shaping its access to external
knowledge and possibilities of collaborative technological development
(Granovetter, 1982; 1985).
Within this broad tradition, there are a number of variants on the idea that
decision-making within a company on technological innovation is not guided
exclusively by fully informed and rational choice of the most effective
technology for the pursuit of business goals. Lack of knowledge and
uncertainty about outcomes means that companies tend to look for
innovations within a defined trajectory of technical issues and possibilities
(Nelson and Winter, 1977). Some authors see this in terms of a pragmatic
limiting of possibilities shaped by a wish to build on existing competencies
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Others emphasise
the importance of fads and fashions which can become established with
industrial networks (Abrahamson, 1991).
It is worth noting that some authors in the post-Schumpeterian tradition are
less concerned, on the whole, with individual agency, and focus instead on
wider institutional forces, and on barriers and constraints to change. They
are mainly concerned with issues of external influence and support for
organisations involved in innovation or in adopting new technologies. A
growing body of thought, especially among post-Fordists scholars, is that
regional production systems and industrial and technological districts are
increasingly important and that globalisation has its roots in regional
developments.  Although there are considerable differences of emphasis in
terms of where different researchers place the primary explanation for the
emergence of innovation and the degree to which firm level processes are
influenced/determined by different national policies and frameworks for
intervention, there is a general consensus that national or regional
infrastructure is necessary to support, sustain or generally provide a
framework within which innovation and the take up of new technologies
can flourish. At the same time, most accounts stress the importance of
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informal, cultural and institutional ways of operating and learning (Nelson,
1983; Lundval et al., 1992; Andreasen et. al., 1995).
The socio-constructivist stream of technology and innovation studies covers
a range of sociologically-based perspectives for understanding the way that
technological innovations are embedded or “socially constructed” within
wider social systems and frameworks of thinking and action, rather than
the products of a priori economic rationality. Although composed by a
number of different streams of research, the approach is usually described
as the “constructionist perspective on technology and innovation”.
At the basis of this last approach there are two related assumptions: that
technology is interpretively flexible, and that technology is at the same
time created and changed by human action, yet it is also used by humans to
accomplish some action, so that it becomes at the same time a product and
a means in the construction process.
The adoption of a constructionist perspective on innovation produces a
profound revision of some of the concepts used by the innovation theorists.
For what concerns migration of innovation within local and wider contexts,
constructionist authors generally dispute the notion of diffusion for being
totally insensitive to the issue of interpretive flexibility and the inherent
“equivocality” of technology (Barley, 1986; Weick, 1990; Orlikowski, 1992).
In alternative, they purport explanatory mechanism for the “diffusion of
innovation” which are consistent with their emphasis on the social, political
and cultural aspects of the innovation process.
Actor network scholars, for example, conceive the spread of innovation as
a process of “translation”, which they consider as the main way in which
ideas travel outside their original local context (Callon, 1986; Law, 1987;
Callon and Law, 1989, Law, 1992). The notion of translation implies that
production and circulation are not distinct, but are instead intimately linked
- indeed indissociable - consequences of a single strategy: that is, the
articulation of novel networks with preforming networks, such that the
products mobilised in each might circulate in the other”. Central to the
understanding of the process of innovation circulation is hence the
explanations of the tactics and strategies adopted by “translators” in the
process of designing sociotechnical networks and imposing these on others.
Other authors stemming from the symbolic interactionist tradition emphasise
the importance of non formalised communication as a mean of circulation
of new knowledge and innovation. Lave and Wenger (1991) and Brown
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and Duguid (1991), for example, addresses the issue by introducing the
notion of community of practice. The community of practice has been
conceptualised as an informal aggregation defined not only by its members
but by the shared manner in which they do things and interpret events. The
community consists of a set of relations among persons, activity, and world,
over time and in relation with other tangential and overlapping communities
of practice It is defined not only by its members, but also by the way in
which certain things are done, and how events are interpreted. In the
community of practice relations are created around activities, and the
activities take form through social relations, so that specific competencies
and experiences become part of the individual identity and take place within
the community.  The community of practice constitutes the arena in which
the processes of transmission of tacit knowledge and of knowledge-in- action
takes place. Learning and innovation are defined not in terms of acquisition
of abstract knowledge, but as a form of coparticipation in some of the actual
practices of the workplace. Because communities of practice transcend the
formal boundaries between organisational sub units and between
organisations, they become a feasible way of explaining the dissemination
and adoption of innovations (Brown and Duguid, 1991).
Finally, on a broader scale, constructionist scholars have pointed to different
forms of institutionalisation and to fashion as powerful drivers of innovation.
Abrahamson (1991) dismisses Roger’s analysis of innovation-diffusion
literature for being biased toward a rationalist and “efficient-choice”
perspective of organisations’ behaviour. Accordingly, the author attempts
to rescue the despised notion of managerial fads and fashions as way of
approaching innovation diffusion from a more sceptical and realistic
perspective.
Czarniaswka and Joerges (1995) suggest that the notion of fashion represents
a feasible way for keeping together the two seemingly alternative ways of
conceiving innovation as an intentional and planned choice or as the
materialisation of ideas, for example, suggest that the notion of fashion
may provide a way of combining in a single, rich context various types of
social and political actors as well as several levels of reality: the decision-
maker, the professional groups inside and outside a company, the
organisation, the organisational field, the institutionalised environment.
Following fashion in a company can be a way of keeping abreast of the
competition, a way of keeping up with the times in the interest of the people
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by being in the forefront of novelty. Fashion, as a collective translation
process, also function as a release from the responsibility of individual
choice. To follow fashion is to be conformist and creative. Fashion is
evolution without destination (an alternative to the notion of progress).
Not all organisational ideas which are in fashion at a given time are tried
out by all organisations in a given space-frame; fashion has its niches,
merchants of meaning cultivate their specialities. Such collectives of fashion
followers are delineated in a process of structuration of organisation fields.
Once a field has been structured , forces arise which prompt the organisations
in the field to become more alike. Di Maggio and Powell (1983) speak of
coercive isomorphism - organisations are forced or encouraged to be alike
by actors outside the field -; mimetic isomorphism - organisations imitate
one another when faced with uncertainty -; and normative isomorphism,
related to the role of the state and the professions.
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It appears that  since the first “energy crisis” of the post-war period, in the
early 1970s, a considerable amount of public and industrial funding has
been sunk into the development of technologies to produce more energy
efficient machinery, as well as renewable energy sources, with a view to
reducing energy consumption per unit of industrial output. Across the
European Union, however, the picture is uneven.
In order to understand the patterns of take up of AETs in different countries
one has to take into account differences in the national systems of innovation
(Lundval , 1992; Nelson, 1993). The study reveled the existence of broad
differences in national policies and levels of government assistance for
encouraging energy efficiency in manufacturing, as well as differences in
terms of the priority that is commonly given to reducing energy costs under
these different regimes. While most European member states have introduced
schemes encouraging enterprises to find ways of reducing energy
consumption and emissions, approaches vary considerably between
countries.  In our sample we found a marked difference between the two
northern continental member states (Denmark and the Netherlands) and
the UK and Italy.
Denmark and the Netherlands have established widespread programmes of
support for energy saving within enterprises and for the use of renewable
resources in general within industry.  Both of these countries are
characterised by a tradition of high involvement of all industrial and political
actors in the formulation and implementation of energy saving policies.
These policies usually combine the imposition of energy related taxes with
schemes allowing enterprises to obtain tax advantages in return for
significant improvements in their energy efficiency and environmental per-
formance.  Denmark and the Netherlands have government-established
voluntary agreements which allow energy intensive industries to reduce
3. NATIONAL CONTEXTS:
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
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their “green tax”-level following specific and audited energy-efficiency
improvements.  Schemes of this kind usually also include access to subsidies
and of technical know-how in the form of consultancy to innovating firms.
By contrast, the United Kingdom has adopted a more laissez-faire approach.
No major regulative framework has been put in place, nor specific
environmental taxation or subsidy schemes.  There are however a number
of government sponsored initiatives to promote the take-up of energy-
efficient technologies and general energy efficient management practices.
Nonetheless, there is no unifying framework for these policy instruments.
The basic approach is therefore to leave energy-efficiency to market forces,
with increasing de-regulation of energy supply, and open competition in
energy prices between suppliers.
Italy represents a middle way between the high level of public intervention
typical of the Netherlands and Denmark, and the market approach adopted
by the UK government in the 80s and early 90s.  In Italy electric power
energy production is a tight state monopoly, controlled by a large
bureaucratic public corporation.  A major government intervention at the
beginning of the ‘90s was aimed at modifying the power supply side market
structure and allowed a number of new actors to enter power production.
Further initiatives addressing energy demands were not conceived in terms
of agreements on reducing consumption, nor were they accompanied by
any form of tax pressure.  Instead, the government focused on specifics
such as the introduction of a mandatory energy manager in firms above a
certain size, on allowing actors other than the state-owned monopoly to
produce power, and on providing significant financial subsidy and grants
for firms interested in introducing technological innovation in the field.
However, implementation of the two laws and the subsidy schemes remains
incomplete, with many of the benefits provided by the legislation neutralised
by the intervention of other factors, such as bureaucratic complications in
the issuing of licences for self-production and redefinition of the limits on
pollutants emitted by small industrial plants, etc.
In what follows the contextual data at the national level are summarised
and tabled.  This allows an easy comparison between the situation in the
countries participating in the research.
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The broad national differences between policies and priorities given to the
issue are reflected in the definitions as to what are considered Advanced
Energy Technologies (AET) in manufacturing processes. For example, is
some countries combined power and heat production is still considered a
fairly advanced techniques while in others it is considered non innovative,
well established technology.
As a result the following working definition of what counts as AET was
proposed:
1. AET refers to a new or recent technology, technique or methods tested in
laboratories, available on the market, but only implemented at company
level to a limited extent .
2. The technology or methods must promote energy efficiency and
conservation. Furthermore, the technology or methods must assist in
achieving quality improvement, higher output levels, a better working
environment, more competitive energy utilisation,  lower costs, etc.
3. A number of areas of engineering  are of relevance to the implementation
of AET:
Energy expansion/energy production
Energy turnover (e.g. fossil fuel for heat)
Energy and heat transmission
Energy and heat distribution
Energy and heat consumption
Production and processes
Systems, equipment, machines and components
4. WHAT ARE CONSIDERED ADVANCED
ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
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Some examples of technologies that may be considered as fitting with the
above conceptions of AET are:
• Heat recovery with the help of new technology in the shape of water
vapour compression.  For this process no ammonia or heat exchangers are
used contrary to traditional thermal compression for heat recovery.
• New methods and techniques for recycling and heat recovery of exhaust
air from foundry exhaust systems.
• Use of computer based operation and supervision systems for energy
supply, energy and heat distribution and for controlling end-user
consumption.
• Computer based process control in production and processes, executed as
either centralised or decentralised operation systems.
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The research design was based on the progressive refinement of an
explanatory framework put forward at the outset of the project.
A number of case studies were carried out by partners in the four participating
countries.  The case studies covered the following industrial sectors:
Table 6 Case studies
SECTOR TYPE OF NO. OF PARTICIPATING
PRODUCTION COMPANIES COMPANIES
STUDIED
Paper industry Integrated Four large Parenco, NL
companies Burgo, I
Tullis Russell, UK
Danisco, DK
Metal/foundry Integrated Two large and Needstaal,NL
two small-medium British Steel, UK
companies Alfer - Baxi, UK
Valdemar Birns, DK
Insulation/ plastic Decomposable One large and Unidek,NL
/modular one medium company Sogeplast, I
Food Decomposable One large company Vestiyske Slagterier, DK
/ modular
5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Data from the 11 firms were collected through a combination of structured
and semi-structured interviews and by examining secondary data sources
such as corporate documents and reports.  At the end of the case study work
each of the partners held national Working Conferences, with interested
industrialists and policy makers.  Qualitative analysis of the case study and
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Working Conference data provided the basis for further development of the
conceptual framework.
The final SORGET framework was supported by a European survey aimed
at gathering further data and testing some working hypotheses.  The survey
was administered by telephone in six EC countries (Germany, Denmark,
Sweden, Netherlands, Italy, and United Kingdom) to firms in the paper and
metal foundry industries.  The results of the survey allowed further
refinement of the framework and formulation of some general criteria for
the development of national and European level policies for encouraging
take up of advanced energy technologies in manufacturing.  They also
permitted identification of some specific policy actions.
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In the companies studied we found that energy efficient technologies are
usually not treated differently from other innovations.  Decision patterns
regarding the adoption of energy efficient technologies do not differ
fundamentally from those used for other types of innovations.  Firms, both
large and small, tend to adopt state of the art, well-tested equipment, and
they make their judgements on the reliability of a new technology mainly
on the basis of information received from their formal and informal networks,
and on the behaviour of direct competitors.  The formal method used for
investment decisions is that of investment appraisal, where future financial
savings are off-set against the investment needed, and a pay-back period
calculated.  If the pay-back period falls within an acceptable limit (usually
between one and two years), the technological investment is approved.
Even in the most progressive and aware firms, energy technologies became
regarded in this way as a “predominantly technical” issue.  This is a
significant finding, for it partially explains why energy is so rarely prominent
in top management priorities and agendas.  It also indicates a possible point
of organisational resistance in that, to an extent, energy technologies are
perceived as being part of the “engineers’” agenda.  They become pawns in
typical patterns of conflict and negotiation enacted by technologically-
oriented and financially-oriented managers, over which new investments
are to be approved and which rejected or deferred.
Given this common investment appraisal approach it is not surprising that,
in spite of significant differences between national policy contexts, our 11
case studies  revealed a number of basic issues and relationships affecting
take-up of energy efficient technologies at company level.  These appear to
be relevant and illuminating in different companies spread across different
sectors of manufacturing and countries.  The issues and relationships are
summarised in Figure 2.
6. UNDERSTANDING THE TAKE UP OF
ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
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The framework posits that the key factor underlying the pattern of take-up
(or non take-up) of particular energy efficient technologies or measures
within a firm can be understood as a scope of consideration (i).  This amounts
to a set of organisational routines which at any point in time effectively
prescribes the range of energy-related technologies or measures to be
considered for adoption.  Technologies may not be adopted because they
are formally investigated and then rejected, for example because the pay-
back period for a return on investment capital is too large.  However,
technologies may also simply not be considered, because they lie outside
the scope of consideration, usually because their implications in terms of
disrupting established production technologies and ways of operating make
them too risky to be given formal consideration.  The key to understanding
take-up of energy technologies is not so much formal decision-making
criteria as how decision horizons are shaped.
The framework argues that the scope of consideration is shaped most directly
by two further sets of factors:  the priority given to energy considerations in
strategic thinking and action within the firm, which we call the corporate
energy stance (ii), and the socio-technical nature of the production process
(iii), in terms of how vulnerable it is to disruption by new investments in
new process technologies.  The third level of explanation offered by the
framework consists of examining how (ii) and (iii) are in turn shaped by
the national energy supply and regulatory regime (iv), the nature of market
pressures experienced by the firm (v), and the nature of its linkages with
other firms (vi), including competitors and suppliers of capital equipment
and knowledge.
In what follows, we now discuss some more detailed ways of conceptualising
(i) to (v), and the relationships between them.
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Figure 2: Conceptual Framework
6.1 Scope of consideration of different types of energy efficient
technologies
The case studies and working conferences suggested that decision-makers
in firms observe some basic distinctions between different kinds of energy-
related technologies or measures, based on how directly or intimately these
technologies are connected with core production processes and technologies.
Technologies or measures that have a greater impact on core processes  or
which involve a wide social and technical system in their implementation
are seen as more risky, and are seen as implying a wider  scope of
consideration.  Figure 3 illustrates four basic categories of energy-related
measures and technologies, and shows how they typically relate to an
expanding scope of consideration.
1. Technologies involved in primary or core production processes, e.g.
melting metals
2. Computerised systems for monitoring and controlling energy production
and consumption
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3. Energy production and acquisition technologies, e.g.  co-generation;
technologies involved in secondary production processes, e.g.  production
of steam or other gasses to be used within primary production processes.
4. Re-negotiating energy supply tariffs.
While most energy is generally used in primary production processes,
according to our case studies firms seldom consider introducing substantial
modifications to core processes on the basis of energy considerations alo-
ne.  Even in presence of a very positive innovative attitude, energy saving
initiatives tend to focus on the other types of innovations leaving the core
production processes untouched and unexploited in terms of energy saving
opportunities.  The reason is both cultural and operational:  very often the
identity of the firm is built around the core production process, so that energy
is perceived as an ancillary competence.  Managers and technicians express
this by affirming that “we are not in the business of saving/producing/selling
energy”.
At the other end of the spectrum, the method of reducing the “energy bill”
most likely to fall within the scope of consideration for firms we studied
concerned re-negotiating tariffs of energy acquisition and entering into “load
management” agreements.  According to these, firms undertake not to
consume above certain levels during defined peak consumption hours, in
return for buying electricity at more favourable rates.  Most of the firms we
examined had in place initiatives aiming either to negotiate lower tariffs
with suppliers and/or to reorganise production so that the most electricity-
intensive processes could run during the part of the day when energy costs
were lowest.  Action to reduce the energy bill by modifying the tariff structure
was considered non-problematic, both because it did not require modification
of the existing production processes, and because it was based on non
technical, financial and negotiation competencies that were easily understood
at all levels of the organisation - most significantly at Board level.
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Figure 3: Categories of Energy Efficient Technologies and Measures
Next on the scale in terms of perceived difficulty and likelihood to be fall
within the scope of consideration we found innovations concerning energy
generation.  This was a frequently considered option, although the viability
was strictly dependent on the constraints and opportunities provided by
national regulations.  So, for example, co-generation was extensively pursued
in Italy, but only as long as favourable conditions stemming from local
legislation were in place.
The take up of innovations in secondary production processes, such as the
production of steam or other gases needed for primary production activities,
was fairly common in our case studies.  However, the prominence of the
technological changes involved varied considerably.  In some cases
innovations were simple add-ons to existing processes, for instance new
energy-efficient pumps and air compressors, while in other cases they
involved some modifications of the existing production processes which
required broader changes within the manufacturing process.  The commonest
focus for energy-related technical innovations was in fact in this area of
secondary production processes and systems.
Energy-monitoring and control systems were perceived as a separate and
higher level of intervention because of their nature and premises and so
make up a third step of difficulty as the scope of consideration is expanded.
The introduction of control systems arguably marks a shift from a local to a
global perspective, and it is usually based on a number of existing, successful
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energy saving interventions.  The challenge set by energy-control systems
is not derived so much from the magnitude of the required investment,
which is usually reasonably low, as from their tendency to span the
boundaries of operational units.  This requires the redesign of information
flows and a higher level of co-ordination in processing data on energy
consumption and taking action.
A further dimension for understanding the scope of consideration of energy-
related technologies within a firm is of how far technologies that span the
established sociotechnical boundaries of production units can be
contemplated.
We found that there is a tendency for enterprises to distinguish between:
a) innovations within the boundaries of product units, e.g.  within the
plastic bottle production cycle:
b) innovations that span the boundaries of product units, e.g.  spanning
bottle production, preparation of soft drinks and bottling.
Innovations that fall within the established boundaries of production units
are compatible with a narrower scope of consideration.  The wider the
implications of a technology, the wider the scope of consideration needs to
be.
It is important to emphasise that the perceived difficulty or “height” of
each step in Figure 3, or the scope of change across different portions of the
production process that can be contemplated are not objectively set.  The
allowable scope for innovation depends both on the socio-technical
characteristics of the innovation and the overall production process and on
the pattern of influence within the firm regarding energy matters.  It is the
interaction between these that determines which energy efficient
technologies can be considered as “feasible” for a specific firm, and whether
the disruption associated with moving up a “step” is perceived as a barrier,
or simply as a problem that can in fact be solved.
6.2 Socio-technical constraints on the scope of consideration
of energy technologies
How the boundary of the scope of consideration is drawn around which
energy-efficient technologies in which of the four steps of difficulty is first
of all shaped by the nature of the firm’s production process.  The essential
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consideration is how vulnerable the process is to disruption by various kinds
of technical change.  This vulnerability to disruption may be conceptualised
in terms of the following aspects, which combine to shape the way in which
people within the firm perceive the allowable scope for consideration of
innovations.
Is the production process highly integrated in terms of how materials are
transformed (e.g.  continuous processing of bulk chemicals), or easily
decomposable into a number of distinct transformations (e.g.  batch
manufacture and assembly of manufactured goods)?
More integrated production processes are likely to mean that modification
at one point has repercussions on many others, which increases the perceived
scope of an innovation, reducing the scope of what can be easily considered.
How modular as opposed to integrated is the hardware? Is it possible to
change only one piece, and if so, what are the effects on other pieces of
machinery?
Even in decomposable production processes there may be interdependencies
between phases or stages of the production: the width of the paper produced
by one machine needs to be compatible with that accepted by machinery
dealing with the next stage of the production process.  The more integrated
the hardware, the greater the pressure to restrict the scope of what can be
considered by what of technical changes.
How many  suppliers are involved in providing and servicing capital
equipment?
In some cases capital equipment requires the intervention and collaboration
of a complex supply network of specialised suppliers and service companies
- the supply chain - both up stream and down stream.  This may affect the
way in which the scope of the innovation is perceived.  The more complex
the network supporting a particular area of process technology, the smaller
the scope of changes that can be easily considered.
What is the potential for impact of technical changes on inter-firm production
flows?
Disturbance and risk may affect not only the firm but its customers.  This
aspect of the socio-technical system  is especially important for firms
constituting an intermediate link in manufacturing supply chains, and leads
to narrowing the scope of innovations that can be considered.
How reliable is the innovation considered? What are the risks and
consequences of failure?
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In processes that are highly integrated, or when there is a tight
dependency between stages the risk of failure at one point deriving from
the introduction of an innovation is amplified throughout the whole process.
This again narrows the scope of what can be considered.
What is the life cycle of the existing technology and its asset value?
The asset value of the existing equipment in view of its projected
life cycle is a key factor affecting the scope of changes that can be considered.
Limitations are especially significant for sectors where the life cycle of the
technology is especially long (e.g. cement).
Are there exit barriers deriving from previous technological paths?
Technological paths derive from the history of innovations and
previous technological choices.  Particular decisions made in the recent or
far past may either preclude some of the available options, or increase the
cost of exit, again effectively limiting the scope of what can be considered.
6.3 Corporate stances on energy
According to our framework both the position of energy in the hierarchy of
priorities and the balance of influence within the firm are of paramount
importance to the process of take up of energy efficient technologies.  For
example, prior to fieldwork the research team had a hypothesis that
production process characteristics might affect energy innovation readiness,
so that companies who base their core production on highly integrated
processes were less ready to implement energy-efficient technologies than
those operating on a batch basis.  However, it emerged that this is not a
general rule, and the constraints set by integrated process-based production
can easily be overcome through an integrated energy strategy.  In our study
it emerges that different organisational orientations toward energy can easily
supersede more traditional “hard” organisational variables such as kind of
production process, size of the firm, and even energy intensity.  Two of the
most “proactive” firms in our sample were, for example, a large, highly
integrated and energy intensive firm, and a flexible, innovative SME with
low energy intensity decomposable production process in the plastic sector.
Moreover, our case studies suggest that the priority given to energy matters
within a firm, including the authority, autonomy, and influence of “energy”
managers or engineers, and the kinds of energy efficient innovations explored
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and implemented reinforce each other.  Firms  tend to produce consistent
patterns of behaviour toward energy related matters in time.
We refer to such patterns of behaviour as “corporate stances” toward energy
matters, where each stance describes and typifies the outcome of the daily
process of action and negotiation between influential members within the
organisation or one of its parts.  Our case studies offered powerful
illustrations of the impact of  the weight attributed to various forms of energy-
related expertise and the extent to which energy concerns are institutionalised
in organisational routines.  We found there was a dominant logic of action
motivating key people which has a significant impact on the decision
landscape shaping energy related innovations.  We identified four basic
“corporate stances” toward energy saving in manufacturing:
• First, there are firms and companies with “proactive” attitudes toward
energy technologies and energy saving.  Companies of this type perceive
primary and secondary production processes, energy production processes
and control devices in an integrated way and tackle energy issues with a
systemic, strategic approach.  They tend to give prominence to energy
matters, and promote innovation and research for new solutions in this area.
Accounting and reporting practices are aligned with this attitude, so that
energy-related costs and savings can be measured and fed back to decision-
makers.  At the same time, energy becomes a normal part of the considering
production requirements, and energy services are considered as one of the
core functions in the firm.
• Second, some firms and companies exhibit a “reactive”, event-driven
attitude toward energy issues.  While this stance does not  preclude the
possibility of adopting energy efficient technologies, it also tends to cast
energy-related decisions as minor technical improvements focused on
secondary production processes only.  Within this framework, decision-
making on energy issues is fundamentally fragmentary in nature and
opportunity driven.  In the absence of a long term, broad strategy the
introduction of energy technologies proceeds incrementally, mainly through
“add-ons” to the existing manufacturing processes.  Another way of
conceiving the “reactive “ approach is to think in terms of incomplete cycles
of learning: while parts of the firm develop high local levels of awareness
and in energy-related innovation, organisational barriers hamper the
involvement of the rest of the organisation in the learning process.
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• A third “corporate stance” refers to firms, especially in low energy-inten-
sive sectors, who appear fully aware of the importance of energy efficient
technologies, but do not act,  because they see insufficient return on
investments.  It is worth emphasising in this regard that the “investment”
on which the return is calculated is often framed in terms of the perceived
scope and difficulty of the initiative, and not only in plain financial terms.
• Proactive, reactive, and inactive strategies are all established ways of
dealing with energy improvement and, as such, substantially differ from
the lack of awareness exhibited by some firms.  There is still a substantial
number of firms scarcely aware or totally unaware of the existence of the
opportunities provided by the intentional pursuit of energy saving through
the adoption of energy efficient technologies.  If they happen to adopt an
energy-efficient technology they do it as a matter of course when up-grading
or renewing their capital equipment.  They represent our fourth stance, which
we call simply “unaware”.
Because the difference between ways of considering energy issues mainly
resides at the level of  managerial decision premises and distribution of
influence, it was not a surprise to find that these corporate stances are self-
perpetuating.  This feature of decision and action frameworks is well known
in organisational research: managers persist in ways of thinking and acting
until they are forced to reflect on their decision premises as a consequence
of a major crisis or breakdown, or because of a drastic change in the external
environment.  Only then do they have an opportunity to reflect on the
adequacy of the overall framework, and significant change may follow.
For example, in  firms where a “reactive” stance prevails, innovation
initiatives introduced at the local (shopfloor or sub-unit) level may not be
adequate to modify existing energy perceptions at firm-level decision-
making.  Because energy innovations introduced in the manufacturing
process conflict with established ways of perceiving energy issues (usually
reinforced by reporting and accounting systems which reflect the low priority
given to energy saving), they may fail to give rise to new initiatives, no
matter how successful they are.  They tend to remain isolated “one-offs”.
The salience of energy issues remains low, and it is likely that subsequent
innovations will suffer the same fate.  The innovation process is in a sense
“self-suppressing”, and the relative low interest for energy matters in the
firm self-perpetuating.
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By contrast, in more proactive firms a “virtuous circle” is established in
which top management awareness of energy innovation fuels a host of
initiatives.  In addition to producing perceivable performance benefits for
the firm, these initiatives trigger a process of learning by using, i.e.  the
development of further local innovations, and an intense scanning activity
toward the environment that yields more opportunities for action.  Initiatives
followed by positive results reinforces the importance of energy as an
attention rule for top managers, so that the cycle is self-sustaining and self-
fuelling.  These two processes are summarised in Figures 4 and 5.
Finally, firms who are completely unaware of the opportunities provided
by energy efficient technologies are locked in the position of being unable
to see that they cannot see.
Figure 4: The self perpetuating cycle in firms adopting a “reactive attitude” toward energy
Figure 5: The self perpetuating cycle in firms adopting a “proactive attitude” toward energy
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Stating that the approach to energy issues can be self-perpetuating is not
meant to imply that it cannot change in time.  According to our data, there
are cases where manufacturing firms pursue some significant energy
improvement initiatives for a period, and then “go back to sleep”.  There
are also cases where a significant mass of isolated innovations triggers a
transition to a more strategic perspective.  Accordingly, the transition
between “stance” is not irreversible, and it can move in either direction, so
that both learning and un-learning processes can take place (see Figure 6).
At the same time, on the basis of data gathered for the case studies working
conferences, it is possible to hypothesise that the transition between more
or less proactive “stances” always proceeds incrementally, and that higher
levels of proactivity and awareness correspond to the adoption of more
challenging, more complex and potentially risky energy technologies.
Figure 6: The two way transition between “corporate stances“ toward energy efficiency
The corporate stance on energy is also closely related to more general
patterns of influence at senior management level, particularly the balance
of shorter-term financial considerations compared to longer term
technological priorities.  Whenever top management’s dominant logic is
characterised by a deep understanding of the core production technology,
is proactively oriented and opportunity seeking, there is more scope for
energy saving concerns than when top managers adopt a narrower financial
agenda, or when priority is given to operational and problem solving
activities.  The two patterns of attention shape different approaches to
evaluating opportunity/cost ratios on investments, for example influencing
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different expectations as to what is an acceptable term for the return on
investment.  Financially oriented management tends to impose shorter
payback periods than management guided by a more strategic view of
technological innovation.  Similarly, short term financially-oriented
investment appraisal systems, reflecting the agenda of the top decision-
makers, are not suitable for exposing the profitability of investments in
energy saving technology, so that in a very real sense the two patterns are
self-reinforcing.
Because in even the most advanced situation energy efficient technologies
tend to be perceived as a technical issue, the distribution of knowledge and
competence across levels of the managerial hierarchy becomes critical.
Technically-oriented managers are more apt to perceive technological
opportunities than financial ones, and the lack of a common background
between levels of control in a firm will produce barriers to understanding.
This hampers learning processes from impacting the general strategic level
of the firm.  At times this can become a major cause of miss-communication
and miss-interpretation of the relevance of energy issues.
The fact that energy technology innovation is usually “engineering-led”
and that energy management tends to be technology-dominated is potentially
detrimental to the adoption of energy efficient technologies.  This is
significant for it partially explains why energy so rarely features in top
management rules of attention and agendas.  It also indicates a possible
point of organisational resistance in that to the extent that energy technologies
are mainly perceived as belonging to the “engineers”, they may become
pawns in the typical dynamics that are played out between engineers and
accountancy-based senior managers, as they negotiate which technical
investments are to approved and which rejected or deferred.  In our case
studies, especially in the most “reactive/opportunistic” firms, we found
plenty of evidence of this kind of organisational power struggle:  technology-
oriented people propose innovations that are assessed with suspicion by
financial gatekeepers in a more or less confrontational way.  Other case
studies illustrated a slightly different dynamic, where energy people were
considered as “service” providers by operation managers, so that concerns
about energy issues tended to be poorly reflected in the planning of primary
production processes and the scope for consideration of energy innovations
was restricted to add-ons implemented after the main production process
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had been put in place.
Finally, it is important to note that the influence of the energy manager
heavily depends on the intra-organizational pattern of influence.  As we
shall see, one of the observed effects of national energy-efficiency
frameworks and integrated, long lasting schemes set up by national
regulators is the growth of influence of energy managers, and their increased
financial authority in many firms.  However, whilst the appointment of an
energy manager (or the creation of an organisational unit to deal with energy
efficiency matters) is an important step in the promotion of awareness on
energy related matters within firms, that alone does not guarantee that an
effective learning process will take place within the firm.
6.4 The impact of energy markets, regulation of energy production,
distribution and consumption
Energy intensity and energy cost and tariffs play a central role in the
consideration of energy related issues.  They can be understood as having a
profound impact on the corporate stance.
Energy-intensive firms are more energy aware than low intensive ones
whether or not there are further external pressures such as energy taxes.
Whenever energy constitutes a significant cost driver, it typically occupies
a prominent place in the decision-maker’s agenda.  However, our
observations suggest that intensity only operates as a form of pressure, while
types of actual response change substantially from case to case.
At the same time the relative cost of energy does play a determining role:
the higher the price of energy, the more prominent the issue becomes in the
management agenda.  We also found that energy is seldom considered in
isolation:  energy both as a cost and as a saving opportunity is always
considered within a wider pattern of factors.
The cost of energy and the structure of tariffs are both determinants and
perceived tools for dealing with energy costs.  As mentioned before, besides
considering energy efficient technologies, companies use negotiations on
tariffs as an alternative or parallel route for achieving energy cost savings.
In this sense, general measures influencing the cost of energy and the tariff
structure are unlikely to produce uniform effects, and their capacity to yield
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an increase in the adoption of energy efficient technologies is disputable.
The regime of energy production and distribution also play a central role.
The structure of the energy market can both trigger or discourage the take-
up of energy efficient technologies, or constitute a particular set of conditions
which result in the diffusion of specific energy efficient technologies over
others.  A strict monopoly in the production of electric power combined
with a highly constrained regime of energy distribution may prevent the
adoption of certain types of energy efficient technologies, as may a highly
liberalised production market where competition keeps tariffs at the lowest
possible level.
The case of co-generation and CHP is paradigmatic here.  This was
frequently considered an option in all the participant countries, although its
viability was strictly dependent on the constraints and opportunities provided
by the local energy supply and distribution regime.  For example, co-
generation was extensively pursued in Italy as a feasible alternative to the
constraints imposed by the monopolistic regime of energy production, but
only as long as local legislation allowed the selling of the surplus energy
produced.  In other countries, the barriers imposed by the highly constrained
regime of energy distribution (e.g. in the Netherlands), the high taxes
imposed on self generation (e.g. in Italy for non CHP technologies), or low
energy prices following widespread liberalisation of the market (UK)
invariably acted as deterrents to the adoption of this type of energy
technology.
Finally, there are significant institutional pressures on firms in the form of
regulatory instruments intended to impact on patterns of energy
consumption.  National and transnational regulations, energy taxes and
investment subsidy schemes play an  important role in affecting firms’
attitudes towards energy efficient technologies.  National state interventions
have the effect of drawing the attention of firms to the energy aspects of
their production processes.  Together with the cost or availability of energy
(which is mostly market-determined) state interventions constitute a form
of pressure and may even constitute a source of breakdown that forces the
top management to change their ways of thinking and acting.
In many cases, energy issues are caught in a self perpetuating “cannot see
that it cannot see” situation, in which individual managers do not consider
energy efficient technologies as profitable economic alternatives simply
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because energy matters do not enter their decision horizons.  The imposition
of taxes and levies can, in principle, cure such “spot blindness” in a way
similar to the effect produced by the sudden scarcity of energy during the
two oil crises in the 70s and 80s.  Nonetheless, the imposition of taxes
alone, and even the provision of subsidies, do not necessarily produce a
change in corporate stance towards energy efficient technologies, unless
they are combined into schemes that require firms to stay committed for a
certain period of time and that combine restrictive measures with some
form of technical and know how support.
Although an analysis of the impact of different national incentives to the
take up of energy efficient technologies goes beyond the scope of the current
project, we have identified a number of critical factors capable of producing
a shift in the priority that energy efficiency matters occupy in top
management’s agendas.
Duration and stability of national programmes:  A critical factors is the
duration and stability of national programmes in order to deliver effective
results.  In both the Netherlands and Denmark the schemes’ successes appear
to be related to the effect they have on management agendas.  A reversed
situation in Italy confirms the importance of stability in time.
Effectiveness of  follow up and sanctions:  Our data suggest that not only
duration in time, but consistency of actions and follow-up are necessary for
the success of national regulation frameworks.  The effectiveness and timing
of follow-up actions, control, and the imposition of sanctions in those cases
where the subscribed commitment was not fulfilled is perceived as a
keystone in the long term effectiveness of such initiatives.
Combination of pressure and support:  We found evidence of firms which
responded to tariff pressures, and even took advantage of subsidy schemes,
without being forced to change their overall attitude towards energy-efficient
technologies.  The data illustrates that maximum effect was obtained with
schemes which combined “voluntary” agreements between public and pri-
vate agents with the provision of knowledge and opportunities for firms to
tackle the problems posed by the imposition of the taxes in ways that
radically differed from their established behaviour.  In other words, schemes
that combine pressure and possibility work better than punitive, restrictive
measures.  Moreover, within our sample it was possible to compare a range
of national contexts experimenting with different forms of national
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regulatory frameworks.  For example, the Dutch approach is based on sector
agreements, which specify efficiency goals, whereas the Danish approach
depends on one-to-one agreements between firms and government (via
government agencies) in which specific technologies to be taken up are
spelled out.  Preliminary evaluations carried out in the two countries suggests
that the second formula may be more compelling than the first one.
Cross national standards and regulation may produce a significant impact
on the level of awareness and commitment towards energy efficiency
matters.  This is especially true in the perspective of an EC open market.
On the one hand, the definition of EC-wide parameters (e.g. on CO2 emission
and on energy efficiency) can act as an institutional pressure promoting
awareness of energy efficiency.  On the other the introduction of European
standards specifying energy-related characteristics for certain types of
technologies may help energy efficiency to become an accepted technical
parameter for significant categories of equipment.
6.5 Market and competitive pressure
The competitive position of the firm affects the relevance of energy in many
ways, but does not always positively influence the take up of energy efficient
technologies or the general corporate stance.  For example, a general drive
to reduce costs as a result of extreme competitive pressure in the market is
intuitively a factor influencing the take up of energy efficient technologies.
However, some qualifications apply.
In the first place, extreme market pressure, or a perceived weak competitive
pressure can be one of the causes of self-locking behaviour with respect to
energy innovation.  Firms in financial difficulties, or simply in a tight
competitive position, tend to disregard investments in energy efficient
technologies or impose short - and at times too-short - payback periods for
the investment.  In other words, they tend to adopt a reactive rather than a
proactive stance on energy matters.  From our data it appears that in times
of financial difficulties management tends to focus on core manufacturing
competencies, disregarding alternative ways of improving business perfor-
mance.  Such an attitude is at times reinforced by the way firms carry out
their budgeting processes:  to the extent that capital and expenses are treated
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separately, attention is always driven away from energy improvement.  The
result is a self-locking pattern similar to that described in Figure 4, where
defensive attitudes rule out forms of investment that could produce positi-
ve economic returns.
Firms under competitive pressure may also adopt strategies that focus on
quality and reliability of production and products, hence minimising the
risk of failure.  Such an attitude may affect the way decision makers perceive
the scope of a particular energy innovation, for example making core process
innovation appear too risky in view of the possible costs of failure.
Accordingly, cost saving considerations may be neutralised by pessimistic
risk perceptions.
Size, too, may have a relevant impact.  Large firms are more aware than
small ones of the economic benefits of a general energy saving strategy.
This might be a consequence of the fact that large firms are getting more
used to thinking globally, and that, in general, they are more able to envisage
returns on investments by using sophisticated financial planning tools.
General research also suggests that SMEs have traditionally adopted a “fast-
follower” position toward innovation.
In some cases we found that SMEs lack the necessary “critical mass” to
trigger the self-fuelling cycle of innovation and change of attitude.  In
smaller, more reactive cases in our case study we found evidence of local
learning cycles that had failed to permeate through to upper levels of the
organisation.  For example, we found instances where innovations in energy
technologies had been undertaken and opportunities fully exploited.
However, even though they yielded unexpectedly good results that prompted
the search for more innovation, this process was confined to the specific
engineering occupational community, failing to affect general perceptions
at higher levels.
Finally, smaller firms may lack the necessary financial means to embark on
costly investments with long term, marginal returns.  In consequence, SMEs
often prefer to use their available financial resources to invest in core
production processes which will yield a more direct competitive advantage.
Highlighted here then is the importance of forms of support to SMEs not
capable of circumventing these barriers.  Third party financing, SME
consortia, and other innovative forms of financial support all ought to be
considered feasible ways of promoting the take-up of energy efficient
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technologies.
One further and quite different form of market pressure may also manifest
itself in shaping corporate stances and the scope of consideration given to
energy efficient technologies.  We found that the adoption of energy efficient
technologies may be conceived not only in direct economic terms but also
as a way to enhance or improve the “environmental” image of the company.
Energy efficient technologies may be presented to customers and employees
as proof of a commitment to improve standards in terms of the company’s
impact on the natural environment and employee health, its record on safety
and as a well-managed company, and as part of establishing a “socially
responsible” corporate image.
This kind of pressure becomes especially significant for companies
competing in environmentally sensitive markets.  The adoption of energy
efficient technologies enhances the possibility of obtaining “green labelling”,
which depends on environmental and energy performance.  Energy saving
may then climb the scale of priorities for the firm and ceases to be perceived
merely as a technological or production issue, becoming a marketing one.
6.6 The impact of  inter-firm relations
The firm’s inter-organisational network constitutes an important aspect
which affects its stance towards energy efficient technologies and the
processes of take-up.  In all our case studies the behaviour of firms follows
from close scrutiny of perceived competitors.  Suppliers and consultants
appear to a be a fundamental resource in this process of  circulation of
information about available technologies, the viability of the technologies,
and behaviour of competitors.  According to our case studies they constitute
a major mechanism for information circulation that often results in the rapid
spread of innovations across a sector.  The presence of competitors who
gained an advantage from a different way of tackling an issue, such as
considering energy systematically, is likely to trigger imitation efforts by
firms in the same market niche.  Different levels of energy awareness apply
to whole segments of an industry, so that technological competition is played
out at different levels of sophistication in different sectors or segments.
Formal and informal messages on success or failure can stimulate the
diffusion and institutionalisation of not only specific technologies but also
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of whole new attitudes or stances.  This is especially important in view of
the finding discussed above according to which firms, tend to adopt state of
the art, well-tested equipment: the inter-organisational “grapevine” acts both
as a promotion factors and as a barrier.  On the one hand, it is through this
channel that most of the information about reliability, profitability, and
reputation of energy efficient technologies travels within industrial sectors.
On the other hand, however, as data gathered during our working conference
suggest, informal and formal lateral communication among firms support
the circulation of not only positive and truthful comments, but also of
distorted, prejudice reinforcing, and biased information.  Suppliers,
consultants and other external providers of know-how and information
constitute the major mechanism for information circulation, performing
much better than other forms of networking, such as academic or professional
institutions.  All this provides an argument for the promotion of publicly
supported initiatives, such as benchmarking clubs, which strengthen inter-
firm linkages and exchange.  It is worth noting that we found evidence of a
widespread dissatisfaction with the way results of R&D programmes and
information on available energy efficient technologies are disseminated at
firm level.
However, the role of suppliers and private consultants should not be glorified
as it sometimes hinders, rather than promotes, the development of a strategic
attitude toward energy matters within firms.  In an effort to accommodate
specific requests from clients, suppliers very often tend to reinforce the
dynamics in place:  firms that adopt a “reactive” approach will tend to
procure innovations for different segments of the production process from
different suppliers.  Each will then  pursue a separate logic of intervention.
In some cases we found that suppliers “sold” solutions to firms which were
not viable or not aligned with the existing knowledge base or practices,
with the result of discrediting the initiative and of jeopardising the pursuit
of energy saving initiatives.  In many instances we found that private
promotional agencies need to be counterbalanced by the presence of neutral,
non-profit agencies capable of providing independent advice and unbiased
consulting on energy matters.
Because different suppliers relate to different constituents within firms they
have varying impacts on the process of take-up of energy efficient
technologies.  A significant distinction to be made in this regard is that
between suppliers of capital goods and know-how for core and secondary
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production processes, and suppliers for capital goods in energy production
and distribution.
The first group have a direct impact on the possibility of taking up energy
efficient technologies within the manufacturing process.  The key issue is
the establishment of interrelations between suppliers (supply network) beside
the one-to-one relation between the manufacturer and its suppliers.  In fact,
as mentioned above, some kinds of energy efficient technology have a
substantial impact on the whole production process, especially in firms with
a highly integrated production process.  The lack of integration between
suppliers can become a severe obstacle to the adoption of AET, in that it
increases the responsibility of the firm to manage the potential repercussions
that one change could have on the whole process.  As became evident in
some of the cases studied, support initiatives for the promotion of energy
efficient technologies affecting the core production processes will have to
be directed at whole segments of the supply chain, and not just at individual
firms.
Suppliers of capital goods in energy production and distribution may have
a less dramatic impact on the take up of energy innovation within core
production processes, but are, however, an interesting source for potential
innovations.  There is an emerging awareness of the possibility to experiment
with forms of outsourcing (e.g. buying compressed air instead of air
compressors, warm water instead of boilers, etc.) that would transfer the
responsibility of part of the energy related activities within a firm to a
“specialised” subcontractor.  This move could have a substantial impact on
energy efficiency in that it would transfer some of the energy issues from
firms with low energy intensity to energy-intensive and highly energy-
focused ones, where investment in AET would bear a substantial economic
return.  It may be noted however, that the scope of action of this second
group of suppliers is highly constrained by the structure, stability and
flexibility of the energy market and the regime of energy production and
distribution.
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7.1 Methodology and Sample
In order to deepen understanding of the take up of energy efficient
technologies and in order to gather further data on the factors that facilitate
or hinder the take up of energy efficient technologies members of the
SORGET team carried out a telephone survey in late 1997.  The survey2
was administered in six EC countries (Germany, Denmark, Sweden,
Netherlands, Italy, and United Kingdom) to firms in the paper and metal
foundry industries.  The two industries had been selected on the basis of the
following criteria:
• sectors should be at least moderately energy intensive
• they should have identifiable technological opportunities
• they should be present in all participating countries
• they should potentially offer a sufficiently differentiated sample in terms
of size, business volume and corporate structure.
Researchers were able to obtain responses from 93 firms, 42 in the paper
industry and 51 foundries.  SMEs accounted for 60% of the firms in the
overall sample, and were largely prevalent in the foundry industry (40 out
of 51 firms were SMEs, equal to 78%).  On the contrary, most paper firms
were large companies (26 out of 42, equal to 61%), many of them part of
multinational groups.  The great majority of firms were energy-intensive
with energy bills counting for more than 10% of their overall expenses.  At
the same time, almost all the firms (96% in our sample) had promoted some
sort of energy innovation in the last 10 years.
7. FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF EUROPEAN
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
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7.2 Results of the survey
Firstly, the survey aimed at identifying what kind of initiatives firms had
undertaken in the energy efficiency area and when.  Energy efficiency
technologies were divided in three groups according to their distance to the
core production processes:
Housekeeping initiatives, i.e. initiatives targeted at saving energy without
affecting the production process (e.g:  lighting, plant heating and cooling
systems, building envelope, plant ventilation systems).
Supply installations, i.e. installations - no matter how big - that do not require
extensive modifications and adaptation of existing production processes,
such as energy efficient pumps, combined heat and power systems, electronic
systems for optimum control of frequency and speed and any other system
for the recovery and conversion of heat from primary production processes.
Core production process and cycle modifications, which include energy
efficiency motivated modifications to the core production processes such
as in the case of the introduction of pulse or low energy dryers, low energy
refiners, fractionation systems, vacuum forming/moulding systems in the
paper industry, or introduction of energy efficient melting furnaces heating
retaining ovens in the foundry industry.
The survey found that housekeeping and supply installations are more
widespread than core production process and cycle modifications.  In
particular, more than 90% of respondents in the paper industry affirmed
that they had undertaken at least one housekeeping or supply installation
initiative, while only 54% had adopted core process-related energy efficient
technologies.  In the foundry industry we observed the same trend, although
the level of take-up was generally lower:  while 84% of the firms had taken
up housekeeping innovations, 62% had intervened in their core processes.
The distribution of the take-up is summarised in figure 1 below.
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Figure 7
The survey was also designed as a way to provide empirical support for a
number of working hypotheses stemming from the conceptual framework
set out in the previous section.
Institutional and market influence
Almost all respondents (about 85%) affirmed that energy related behaviour
of their firm was not affected in any way by standards or regulations at the
EC level.  About 60% stated that they considered existing regulation and
standards of no relevance.
Promotional initiatives at the national level were considered of scarce impact
with regard to the level of take up of AETs:  in the vast majority of cases
respondents ranked very low or low the importance of public subsidies,
awareness campaigns, public provision of training and technical support,
imposition of levies and taxes and promotion of financing schemes.  As we
will discuss later, in this case national differences apply, but the overall
result is quite consistent across the sample.
While institutions seem to have only a limited impact, market considerations
appeared to be more important:  on a scale from 1 to 5, respondents ranked
on an average 3 the level importance of both environmental image for their
firms and importance of the behaviour of competitors in energy matters.
Notably, however, the results yielded a relevant variance, suggesting a
significant difference of opinions, with the level of importance within the
paper industry higher than in the foundries.
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Sources of input about energy efficiency matters
The survey attempted to identify which were the sources of input upon
which firms rely with respect to energy matters and their perceived
importance.  Sources of input were  combined into three categories:
“institutions” comprising government agencies and professional bodies;
“knowledge brokers”, including research institutes, firms’ own R&D and
consultants; and “market”, comprising trading partners, suppliers of capital
goods, suppliers of materials, suppliers of energy, and other firms
(competitors).
According to the survey, the influence of the input received from the different
sources on energy is in general quite low (average 2.2 on a 1 to 5 scale).
Firms receive different input from the various types of sources: information
about the existence of new technological opportunities is relatively
widespread, and it is derived especially from institutions and suppliers of
capital goods and energy.  Practical advice about implementation and
information about cost effectiveness is obtained through consultants and
suppliers, usually from the technology suppliers.  Suppliers of capital goods
and consultants also constitute the most important source of data on the
reliability of the innovation, while the (scarce) information about the
behaviour of competitors is derived, according to our informants, especially
through publicly supported industry benchmarking initiatives.  Figure 8
summarises the different input provided by the various agencies.
Figure 8
57
The internal landscape
The survey investigated the status of energy matters within our sample.  It
was found that 44% of firms within our sample have a formal or explicit
energy policy, mostly endorsed at the director or senior level.  However,
energy matters are in firm control of operation managers, which in more
than half cases were in charge of the definition, implementation, and
monitoring energy policy.  Only in about 1 out of 3 cases firms did have
specific personnel with energy matters.
The survey found that cost-cutting is the most important reason for giving
attention to energy issues (mean score 4.6 on a 1 to 5 scale of importance),
while pressure from customers or business partners, and linkages to other
aspects of the manufacturing strategy scored medium low (mean scores
between 2 and 3 on a 1 to 5 scale of importance).
In general, in most firms in our sample the issue was perceived of secondary
importance, as shown in figure 9.
Figure 9
Constraints to the take up of advanced energy technologies
Finally, the survey identified what kind of technical, economical or social
factors hinder the take up of energy efficient technologies.
The results suggest that the take up of AETs is prevented especially by
economic and social factors.  Asked to identify which factors could hinder
or had hindered the take up of AETs in their firms, respondents indicated a
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long payback period in 54% of the cases, relevance of the size of the
investment (41%) and difficulty in finding the necessary capital (34%), the
perception of the unreliability of the innovation (43%), an excessive risk of
failure (35%).  Technical factors such as co-ordinating a complex supply
chain, solving the problems posed by a high degree of integration of
production or by the effects of the innovation on other parts of the process
were considered of minor importance, and usually perceived as secondary
issues.
Is there a “maturity” pattern?
In view of the results of the qualitative study we were interested to test
whether some sort of learning curve effect apply to energy innovations,
that is, whether the take up of “less committing” energy innovation prepares
the way for the take-up of more complex innovations which, by their very
nature, require the mobilisation of different and broader patterns of actors
and resources within the firm.  At the same time, we were interested to find
out whether a track history of innovations in the energy area within the firm
had any impact on the take up of new technologies.  The two behaviours
would suggest that a “maturity model” can be used to explain the dynamic
of take up of energy innovation.
In order to investigate the presence of this “maturity” model we tested the
following hypotheses:
H1a:  The take-up of less complex energy innovations is a predictor of
increasing level of overall take up of energy efficient technologies.
H1b:  The take-up of less complex energy innovations is a predictor of the
take up of more complex ones.
H1c:  The take-up of energy innovations in the past is a predictor of
increasing level of take up in the future.
The correlation coefficient in a one-tailed Pearson Product Moment Test
between housekeeping initiatives and the overall level of take-up revealed
a high level of significance (P<.001) thus supporting H1a.  Similarly, we
found a significant correlation between house-keeping innovations and the
take up of core process, with a level of significance for a Pearson Test of
.015.  H1b was thus also supported.
Finally, to investigate the relationship between take-up over time and overall
take-up, we ran a further correlation test.  The one-tailed test yielded a
significant correlation between the take-up of energy innovations in the
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past and an increasing level of take up in the future (P< .001), thus
corroborating H1c.  However, the nature of our data rendered this particular
finding somewhat problematic.  Therefore no definitive conclusions should
be drawn from our study on the existence of a strong maturity dimension in
the pattern of take up of energy-efficient technologies.
The influence of institutional and regulatory pressures
According to our qualitative research, different institutional and regulatory
patterns apply in the countries explored in our survey.  Denmark and the
Netherlands have developed a system of policies and initiatives (such as
voluntary agreements and energy related tax schemes) which determined a
quite high level of institutional pressure on firms to regard energy issues
more centrally.  Such institutional pressure decreased to a medium level in
the case of Sweden and Germany, where only some of these initiatives
were in place, and appeared to be quite low in the United Kingdom and
Italy, although for different reasons.
In order to explore this issue in more detail we tested the following
hypothesis:
H2a  A higher degree of institutional pressure promotes a process of
institutionalisation of energy matters within firms
H2b  A higher degree of institutional pressure affects the level of importance
of energy matters within the firm
H2c  A higher degree of institutionalisation of energy matters within firms
affects take up of energy efficient technologies.
In order to test H2a we studied the correlation between the three groups of
countries with different institutional pressures and what we considered a
reliable indicator of the level of institutionalisation of energy issues within
the firm, i.e., the presence of energy managers who were actually responsible
for implementing energy policies and monitoring energy issues.  The results
of a Cramer’s V Test revealed a significant correlation between institutional
pressure and level of institutionalisation of energy issues within the firm
(P<.001), thus corroborating our hypothesis H2a.
The same statistic was used to test H2b, that is, the existence of a correlation
between high institutional pressure and level of importance of energy matter
for top managers.  Again a significant correlation was found (P=.04582).
Therefore H2b was supported.
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Finally, using Cramer’s V Test we studied the correlation between the level
of institutionalisation of energy issues within the firm and the three different
types of energy innovation, to test our H2c.  The test yielded no significant
correlation between level of institutionalisation and housekeeping initiatives
or supply installations, while a weak correlation was found between levels
of institutionalisation and core production process and cycle modifications
(P< .20).  H2c was hence partially supported.
Effects of size and market characteristics
Finally, we wanted to control for the impact that the different characteristics
of the firms in our sample produced on the level of take up.  First we were
interested to explore if size had an effect on the level of importance of
energy issues for the top management of the firm and on the overall take up
of energy innovation.  The hypotheses were thus the following:
H3a:  The bigger the size of the firm the higher will be the level of importance
of energy matters on top managers’ agenda and the level  of take up of
energy efficient technologies.
H3b:  The bigger the size of the firm the higher will be the level of take up
of energy efficient technologies.
While no significant correlation was found between size and perceived
importance for top managers as stated in H3a, the results of a Cramer’s V
Test supported the hypothesis H3b that a large size of the firm was positively
correlated with the level of take up.  The hypothesis was supported for all
three types of innovation (p<.05). These results are consistent with the results
of previous studies which established the importance of size as a predictor
of take up of technological innovations (Mohr, 1969; Swan and Newell,
1995).
Finally, we were interested to study the impact of the different characteristics
of the two industries.  While the paper sector is a highly concentrated, trans-
national industry in which a few large groups compete within a global
market, the foundry industry is still a somewhat fragmented sector,
characterised by a very high number of firms with smaller, locally-based
market niches.  We reasoned that industries such as the paper one, which
operates within an international horizon, may be more sensitive to the
behaviour of competitors than a more locally oriented industry such as a
foundry, for which institutional pressure may bear more significance.  While
the data confirmed that the level of importance attributed by the paper firms
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was higher than in the foundries, we were interested to understand whether
such difference was reflected in the level of take up of energy innovations.
It was therefore hypothesised that:
H4:  The behaviour of competitors assumes an increasing importance within
a global competitive market.
In order to test H4 we performed two separate correlations between the
three types of innovation and behaviour of competitors in the two industries,
and then we compared the results.  No significant correlation was found
either within or between industries, so H4 was not supported by our data.
The role of corporate stance on energy
We set out to test whether the level of importance attached to energy matters
within the firm affects the overall take up within the firm.  The hypothesis
was therefore the following:
H5:  A high perceived level of importance of energy for the top manage-
ment of the firm is positively correlated with a high level of take up of
energy efficient technologies.
The correlation coefficients of a Pearson Product revealed that while house-
keeping and core process initiatives are significantly correlated with the
level of importance for top managers(P=.  027 and P=.  05), in our sample
this does not apply to the add-ons (P= .21, not significant)
The role of different kinds of market pressure
The survey also established that “cost cutting” represents the most important
reason for attention given to energy issues, while other reasons such as
pressure from customers or business partners, and linkages to other aspects
of the manufacturing strategy were considered of a lesser importance to
determine the relevance of energy issues.  Accordingly we wanted to test
whether these different prevailing “innovation rationalities” within the firms
did actually affect the take up of energy efficient technologies.  The related
hypothesis was, then:
H6.  Within firms the reason for giving attention to energy issues affects the
level of take up of energy efficient technologies and the type of initiatives
undertaken
To explore this we ran a multiple regression analysis between each of the
four different innovation rationalities and the take up of the different types
of energy innovation.  No significant correlation emerged apart from a weak
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one between the perception of energy saving as a cost cutting issue and
housekeeping initiatives (Sig.  T: .14).
We were also interested to understand to the extent to which high priority
given to green issues and energy-saving awareness were related within firms
in the two industries.  Accordingly, we hypothesised that
H7.  The level of importance of green issues and environmental concerns in
the firm are positively correlated with the level of take up of energy-efficient
technologies.
The study of the correlation coefficients in the two industries revealed that
almost no significant correlation emerged in either the paper or the foundry
industry between importance of green issues for the firm and level of take-
up of energy efficient technologies (the only significant correlation was
found in the foundry industry with the core process innovations).  Neither
H6 or H7 were therefore supported by our data.
Table 7:  Summary of results of the hypothesis testing.
IS THERE A “MATURITY” PATTERN?
H1a:  The take up of less complex energy innovations is a Supported
predictor of increasing level of take up of energy-efficient
technologies
H1b:  The take up of less complex energy innovations is a Supported
predictor of the take up of more complex ones.
H1c :  The take up of energy innovations in the past is a Supported3
predictor of increasing level of take up in the future.
THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE
H2a  A  higher degree of institutional pressure promotes Supported
a process of institutionalisation of energy matters within firms
H2b  A higher degree of institutional pressure affects the Supported
level of importance of energy matter within the firm
H2c.  A higher degree of institutionalisation of energy Partially supported
matters within firms affects take-up of energy-efficient
technologies.
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EFFECTS OF SIZE AND MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
H3a.  The bigger the size of the firm the higher will be the Not supported
level of importance of energy matters on top managers’ agenda.
H3b: The bigger the size of the firm the higher will be the Supported
level of take up of energy efficient technologies
H4: Behaviour of competitors assumes an increasing Not supported
importance within a global competitive market.
THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE STANCE
H5.  A high level of importance of energy matters for the Supported
top management of the firm is positively correlated with a
high level of take up of energy efficient technologies
THE ROLE OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF MARKET PRESSURE
H6.  Within firms, the reason for giving attention to Not supported
energy issues affects the level of take-up of energy-efficient
technologies and the type of initiatives undertaken
H7.  The level of importance of green issues and Not supported
environmental concerns in the firm are positively correlated
with the level of take up of energy efficient technologies.
7.3 Implications for the Conceptual Model
The results of the survey substantially support many of the findings of our
qualitative research, whilst at the same time suggesting some significant
refinements.
Differences between types of energy-related innovations
The results of the survey confirm what we found in the field research, namely
that different types of energy technologies are treated differently within
firms.  The differential level of take-up of house-keeping initiatives and
add-ons versus core process innovations, combined with the high priority
accorded to the perceived potential disruption and the risk that the new
technology is likely to produce on the core production processes, confirm
that firms tend to behave quite differently with respect to innovative energy
technologies that get closer to the core production processes.
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Patterns of innovation and corporate stances toward energy efficient
technologies
The results of the survey also support the idea that within firms it is possible
to identify patterns of growth of energy efficient technologies across different
levels of difficulty and risk.  Our findings that the take up of less complex
innovations is likely to positively influence the take up of more complex
ones and that, in general, the take up of less complex innovations is likely
to be associated to a higher level of take up suggest that some kind of
development or learning process takes place within firms.  Moreover, the
finding that the take-up of innovation in the past is a predictor of succeeding
innovations suggests that the model may follow a “maturity” dynamic
whereby the firms acquires more confidence and trust in the value and
benefits of investing in energy innovation during time.
The maturity model can be explained in very practical terms as a process of
increasing institutionalisation of energy issues within the firm, e.g.  the
appointment of an energy manager or the issuing of energy policy and
programmes, a phenomenon already observed in the case studies.  This
establishes a recursive pattern, by virtue of which energy people and energy
issues become together more important within the firm and together increase
the level of take-up of energy efficient technologies.  Accordingly, the results
of the survey supports the usefulness of the concept of “corporate stance”
toward energy matters, where the stance typifies a daily process of action
and negotiation between influential members within the organisation or
one of its parts, as well as the resulting priority of energy in the agenda of
the firm’s management.  The survey also supports the notion that corporate
stances towards energy innovation are results as well as premises of the
dynamic of take-up of energy technology:  they are stable in the short-term
but subject to change as result of strong pressures, and influenced through
a number of factors.
The influence of socio-technical characteristics of production
The survey suggests that the socio-technical characteristics of production
processes, such as solving the problems posed by the high degree of
integration of the production, and dealing with the effects of the innovation
on other parts of the process are perceived as playing only a minor role in
encouraging or discouraging investment in energy efficient technology.  A
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much greater role is played by the general priority allocated to energy in
management deliberations.
Factors that influence the corporate stance towards energy innovations
The survey helped deepen our understanding on which factors influence
the corporate stance toward energy matters and the take up of energy.
Institutional pressure
In the first place the survey revealed the fundamental importance of state
institutional pressure as a way to influence the internal landscape of the
firm prompting greater attention for energy issues.  The survey confirmed
that institutional pressure can both raise the profile of energy with top ma-
nagement and help internal energy specialists to gain a more influential
position, thus supporting take up of energy efficient technologies and the
overcoming barriers posed by a limited scope of consideration.  At the same
time, the results of the survey confirmed that institutional forms of pressure
which are stable and consistent in time, and which combine pressure with
support are more effective in promoting a more proactive stance toward
energy matters within firms than other forms of government intervention.
The survey in fact indicates that institutional initiatives which do not combine
promotion with pressure, such as simple awareness campaigns, or public
assistance for training, are likely to have only a limited impact.
The role of market pressures and economic rationality
The survey also confirmed the significance of market influences.  Firms
respond to the behaviour of competitors.  This is true of all firms, and it is
not a prerogative of large ones only, as previously hypothesised in our study.
The survey corroborated the relevance of size in the dynamic of take-up of
energy efficient technologies.  We found that while there are not substantial
differences in the level of awareness with regard to energy issues, contrary
to what we hypothesised on the basis of our qualitative study, there is in
fact a significant difference in the level of take up.  It appears that while
large companies may embark in large strategic projects, SMEs take a more
reactive attitude that very often consists in waiting until a piece of equipment
is obsolete to replace it with a more efficient one.  Finally, contrary to our
expectations, we found that market pressures to respond to environmental
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and energy concerns are not necessarily related, and in fact they are dealt
with quite separately, especially within large firms.
Business economic rationality plays a determinant role in the take up of
energy innovations, however, it also reveals an apparent inconsistency. On
the one hand it suggests that economic reasons lie at the core of the decision
making process about whether to take up an energy innovation, while on
the other it shows no significant relation between the reasons given for
paying attention to energy issues and actual take up.
A possible explanation may be that economic and financial categories are
used by top and middle managers as the accepted way to describe and
account for the complex social and technical processes that determine which
innovation is considered and eventually taken up.  Economic and financial
concerns are taken into consideration and addressed by all the different
actors within the firm, although each of them use economic categories to
support their own distinct agenda.  Accordingly, economic categories and
ways of reasoning are important ways for talking about energy innovation
issues, however, their role in influencing in framing options for take up is
less determinant that it may appear.  Institutional pressures stemming from
public policy and from messages passed through inter-firm linkages are at
least as significant in terms of framing the scope of options that can be
considered.
Inter-firm linkages
The survey confirms the importance of linkages with competitors, suppliers
and research and development organisations in particular as sources of
information on new energy related technologies, their reliability and what
is involved in implementing them.
7.4 Limitations of the survey and the implications for its results
Some of the procedures used to sample the firms and to obtain access may
have a significant impact on the results of the survey are therefore worth
reporting.  As indicated above, firms to be surveyed in the present research
were identified with the help of Industry and Professional Bodies and
Government or Government related Energy agencies.  In most cases the
collaborating institutions - usually the energy department or energy office -
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provided a list of potential contacts drawn from their own databases.  Because
of the nature of the collaborating agencies this meant that the contact firm
had a track history of interest, and, occasionally, of action in energy efficiency
initiatives.
It must be noted that this sampling procedure was functional for the general
objectives of SORGET, to deepen understanding of the factors that facilita-
te or hinder the take up of energy efficient technologies.  In order to study
enablers and barriers we needed to focus on cases in which the take up had
been at least attempted and possibly succeeded.  However, this strategy
yielded some descriptive statistics that cannot be considered representative
of the entire population of the two industries, especially for what concerns
absolute frequency values.  For example, it must be noted that the level of
take up of energy efficient technologies revealed by our survey is very high
compared with anecdotal evidence and researchers’ expectations.  While
the apparent differences between types of innovation are established, the
overall very high level of take-up is probably an effect of our sampling
procedures.
Similar caution needs to be applied to the results of our inquiry into the
level of information available to companies about energy efficient
technologies.  While declaring their dissatisfaction at the ways in which
information about energy efficient technologies is circulated and
disseminated, a large majority of the firms in the survey confirmed that
they actually received a broad range of information about energy innovation.
This again runs against the expectations of the researchers and may well be
a result of the particular sample surveyed.  Finally, care should be taken in
extending the results of the survey beyond our sample, especially in the
foundry industry.  In order to obtain robust data on this fragmented sector,
a much bigger sample than we were able to use needs to be approached.
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A first, very general, conclusion from the work of the SORGET project as
a whole is that no single factor or limited group of factors has a simple
determining role in shaping the take-up of energy efficient technologies
within manufacturing processes.  Our research has led us to posit a
framework which explains take-up as a consequence of a complex interaction
of wide variety of social, economic, organisational and technological
developments.  The range of phenomena that need to be included in the
picture is however perhaps related to a second overall conclusion:  that few
enterprises address energy saving as a strategic priority of the first level.
Most enterprises give energy attention if and when they see it as relating to
primary business objectives.
The extent to which consideration of energy issues is explicit and how it is
linked to wider corporate objectives can be understood in terms of a firm,
at any point in time, exhibiting what amounts to a “corporate stance” on
energy matters.  This is a way of thinking and acting about energy matters,
negotiated between people and demonstrated in their daily behaviour within
the organisation.  The crucial differences between organisations lie in the
extent to which corporate stances are proactive and global as opposed to
reactive and local, in the way that key organisational actors address energy
issues.  The corporate stance is closely linked to the scope of energy
technologies that come up for consideration within the organisation.  More
proactive companies are more likely to consider technologies that impinge
directly on the primary production process.  These entail a greater risk of
disruption to production, and are unlikely to be even considered in firms
where managers habitually think of making local piece-meal changes only.
Our research suggests that at any point in time, significantly different but
stable and self-perpetuating stances may exist in otherwise broadly similar
enterprises.  However, stances also change over time, often in response to
8. CONCLUSIONS
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external pressure.  For example, firms may become more pro-active in
response to public policy measures, in the form of pressure to increase
energy efficiency, combined with external support to increase the firm’s
capability to act strategically and pro-actively.  However, for public policy
instruments to have this kind of impact, they must offer consistency and
stability.  If enterprise decision-makers perceive uncertainty about how long
a particular form of pressure or support will be on offer, they may consider
making investments premised on the particular policy too risky.
This leads us to consider the key elements of a pro-active corporate stance
on energy.  The associated broad scope of consideration of energy
technologies is linked to decision-makers operating within a medium or
long-term perspective in terms of how they see their business and its
development.  If managers are tied to short-term horizons, they are unlikely
to consider extensive investments.
There are two further key inter-linked elements that make up the energy-
related corporate stance.  First, the extent to which top management gives
explicit priority to looking at energy use and efficiency, and scope of
measures they allow themselves to consider.  Second, the technological
capability which the firm can bring to considering and implementing various
energy-efficient measures and technologies.  The most strongly proactive
and global stances appear to require considerable technological capability
in terms of both the firm’s core production process and energy technologies.
This combined capability needs to be present or at least acknowledged at
senior management level, as well as within the process engineering function.
This kind of technological capability is unlikely to exist without top mana-
gement commitment to energy-efficiency, and is indeed likely to foster
further commitment.
This leads us to a consideration of the relationship between a pro-active
and strategic stance on energy efficiency and the general capability to inno-
vate.  The model of the pro-active firm emerging from our research has
many of what research into technological innovation in general has shown
to be the features of the “innovative” firm, able to initiate and manage
technological innovation.  Such firms have pervasive technological skills,
including at senior level.  However they also have routines for scanning the
environment for market and technological opportunities for considering
and selecting options and for implementing change projects.  It may be
productive to think of energy-efficiency as a further dimension of the
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“learning organisation”.  The practical implication is to seek to build in the
dimension of energy efficiency into support that firms are given on
technological innovation in general.
Whilst this research has stemmed from concerns of how to encourage take-
up of energy technologies, it is worth considering whether it is desirable or
appropriate for all branches of manufacturing to adopt stances that are more
pro-active on energy matters.  It may be much more important to focus
attention on more energy intensive sectors.  There are arguably greater
benefits to be gained here than might be suggested by modelling exercises
based on assessing the energy saving potentials of particular pieces of
machinery and then assessing the unexploited potential take-up of each
technology.  The potential for greater energy efficiency stems from the
corporate stance and the associated capability for innovation.  With a highly
pro-active stance, the potential for energy savings is likely to exceed
significantly the sum of the savings potentials of a number of discreet pieces
of machinery.  The pro-active stance looks for energy saving at a systemic
level as well as at the local level.
On the basis of the result of the case studies, working conferences and
survey it is possible to formulate some general criteria for the development
of national and European level policies.  These indicate some policy actions
which are useful for encouraging take-up of advanced energy technologies
in manufacturing, as well as giving warning of measures that may prove
counterproductive.
Policy makers should balance pressure and support. Because energy
efficiency cannot be achieved at the expense of other important factors
such as competitiveness and level of employment, special attention needs
to be given to considering in advance the systemic effects of any policy
initiative.  Interventions aimed at promoting take-up of advanced energy
technologies at European, national or regional levels need to be informed
by a coherent and comprehensive perspective.  Above all, they will need to
carefully balance pressure on the enterprise and support for change.  Any
form of pressure in terms of taxes or levies should be complemented by an
effort to increase support to firms, both in terms of access to relevant
knowledge and capital, and in terms of an increased flexibility in the regi-
me of production and distribution of energy.
Initiatives will have to be targeted at the top level of firms, attempting to
attract the attention of decision makers.  Issues need to be framed in a
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language and a context appropriate for top management audiences.  There
is a need for policy makers to promote a shift of perception of energy saving
in manufacturing from a negative/apocalyptic view (i.e. focusing on the
environmental problems and social costs related to CO2 emissions) to a
positive one.  As in the case of other environmental issues, energy saving
can be see as a potential emerging economic sector located at the intersection
of manufacturing and service activities.  Efforts should be made to raise
awareness that energy saving may well become a trigger for the emergence
of new business opportunties and new high tech jobs.
Promoting the take-up of advanced energy technology in manufacturing
should be especially focused on the  most energy intensive sectors. Different
strategies may be necessary to promote different kinds of energy efficient
technologies and to reach firms of different size in different sectors.  The
most energy intensive sectors are likely to be the receptive audience and
fertile ground for change, however.
Relatively small price or tax variations alone are a weak means of
influencing substantial change in a firm’s stance towards energy matters.
Care should be taken in using tariffs and prices as a form of pressure for
energy saving.  Apart from possible negative repercussions on national
competitiveness, the use of tariffs alone has shown itself incapable of raising
the status of energy issues amongst overall management priorities.  By the
same token, complete liberalisation of the energy market is hardly a pana-
cea.  More research is needed to understand the complex and perhaps
counterintuitive consequences of the liberalisation of energy markets.
In general, energy efficiency should not be promoted as an isolated issue,
and should always be related to the development of wider business,
technological and strategic capabilities within the firm.  Pursuing energy
efficiency as an aim in itself on the basis of rational or environmental
considerations may reveal itself as unproductive.  A more powerful stance
is likely to be seeking to influence greater energy efficiency activity as part
of encouraging more general organisational learning and technological
innovation.
Mobilise relevant actors. Appropriate initiatives should be taken to mobilise
the top management of large firms and other relevant actors in the corporate
landscape through the collaboration of EC and national- level sectoral
organisations.  Sector-level voluntary agreements and “white papers” should
be instigated, to raise awareness of energy efficiency in manufacturing.
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Consideration should also be given to the involvement of trade unions at all
levels.  Otherwise trade unions may see energy efficiency measures as for
example undermining employment levels.
Promote voluntary agreements. Voluntary agreements between regulators
and firms constitute a powerful tool to promote the take-up of energy
conservation initiatives and should hence be encouraged.  Voluntary
agreements should be promoted especially in energy intensive sectors and
industries characterised by medium and large enterprises (e.g.  automotive,
paper, chemicals, pharmaceuticals).  Voluntary agreements should always
include a broad range of technical, financial and support initiatives to help
firms to reach their target.  Amongst these are: technical and training
provision with the formula of a fee waiver linked to the implementation of
an agreed plan; training programmes for energy managers and special
investment financing schemes.
Introduce national and EC level standard. Introduction of energy efficiency
standards and mandatory energy labelling systems for manufacturing
equipment at the European level should be considered.  Standards and labels
may refer to both the energy efficiency of the hardware used in the
manufacturing process or to the energy content of products themselves.
Considerations should be made to incorporating such standards with existing
systems of certification such as that of the ISO.
Apply direct market pressure through public purchasing of energy efficient
products or from firms with energy-efficient processes. Policy initiatives
making it mandatory for public agencies to prioritise the purchase of energy
efficient materials and services from energy efficient companies may be
helpful in influencing the market. If these measures are widespread
throughout Europe, there will be minimal dangers of relative economic
inefficiencies.  EC and National governments could in this way exercise
their influence as powerful customers for many of the energy intensive
industries.
Strengthen the role of energy specialists within firms.  Support should be
provided for developing the capabilities of firms with energy technologies
through a number of policy instruments focusing on energy managers and
energy engineers:
• Encouraging networking and benchmarking activities, as well as forums
and associations among energy managers.
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• Supporting and encouraging training programmes for internal and external
energy consultants addressing technical, marketing and change manage-
ment issues.
• Promoting the creation of energy efficiency specialisation and courses in
high education institutions.
• Improving the diffusion of information on energy innovations and energy
saving initiatives.
• Stimulating the introduction of energy efficiency measures within widely
used benchmarking models, e.g.  the Business Excellence Model of the
European Quality Foundation, or the European Environmental Manage-
ment Standard.
Facilitate the emergence of new forms of financial and contractual relations
in energy services. Policy makers should encourage the development and
diffusion of alternative forms of financial and contractual arrangements in
the area of energy services.  This may involve for example removing
contractual, financial, and bureaucratic constraints which hamper the trial
and diffusion of innovative forms of energy services outsourcing
arrangements.  Pressure should be put on public and private sector financial
institutions to facilitate financing, contracting and leasing arrangements
for energy saving investments.  These may be especially effective in
conjunction with other initiatives such as voluntary agreements.  Amongst
others, the following schemes may be considered: access to targeted
facilitated investment funds, provision of financial guarantees to back up
energy efficiency related investment plans, and reduced tax rate on profits
linked to implementation of energy saving plans.
Focus on the later stages of innovation in energy technologies. The emphasis
of EC and national-level financing and support strategies should be more
evenly distributed between the successive stages of technological innovation.
More attention and support should be provided for the later stages of the
innovation process, that is, to demonstration in use and diffusion.  At the
same time, EC and national funds for R&D should always be linked to
energy considerations and targets.
Promote dissemination of information on advanced energy technologies.
Support for research and development on new technologies should be
balanced with the promotion of technical exchange activities and information
dissemination such as the support of networks and forums, and sponsorship
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of energy-related events and trade fairs.  Other forms of dissemination may
also be explored, such as regulatory requirements that demand public utilities
to deliver consultancy and support on energy efficiency, promotion of
regional level information and dissemination centres, and support of local
clearing house agencies to encourage the exchange of information between
suppliers and users.
It should be noted, however, that the latter type of initiative may be of
limited success in certain industrial sectors, and may be most effectively
addressed towards energy-intensive SMEs.
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NOTES
2
 Contacts and access were mostly obtained with the help of professional bodies, government
agencies, and members of the Advisory Panel.  Interviewers contacted the firm and identified
the relevant respondent.  Respondents were then sent a brief explanatory brief pack
describing the aim of the project and the nature of the interview.  Each in-depth interview
required about 20-25  minutes.
3
 The nature of the available data rendered this particular finding somewhat problematic.
Therefore no definitive conclusions should be drawn form our study on the existence of a
strong maturity dimension in the pattern of take up of energy efficient technologies.
